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DON’T GIVE UP SECTION 101,  
DON’T EVER GIVE UP 
Brady P. Gleason+ 
Although adopting one of the most inspirational quotes of the Twentieth 
Century to title an article about patent jurisprudence smacks of hyperbole, the 
challenges facing the U.S. patent system cannot be ignored.1  One particularly 
troublesome challenge is a simply phrased, yet incredibly abstract question: 
what is patent-eligible subject matter? 2   Patent-eligible subject matter 
jurisprudence, governed by 35 U.S.C. § 101, has fallen currently into a “morass” 
and will likely continue its downward spiral as advancements in technology 
challenge the courts’ perception of the scope and role of patent law.3 
Unfortunately, accompanying this confusion are patents’ increasing economic 
influence.4  The U.S. patent system is predicated precisely upon increasing “the 
                                                        
 + J.D., 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.S., 2011, Clemson 
University.  The author would like to extend his deepest appreciation to Professor Megan La Belle 
for her insightful comments and guidance during the drafting of this Comment, as well as Professor 
Elizabeth Winston’s exceptional instruction in patent law.  The author would also like to express 
his upmost thanks to his friends and family for their love and support.  Lastly, the author would 
like to extend his sincere thanks to his colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their 
hard work in editing this Essay. 
 1.  See, e.g., Lily J. Ackerman, Note, Prioritization: Addressing the Patent Application 
Backlog at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 69–71 
(2011) (stating that “[t]he backlog frustrates the promotion of progress in science and technology 
because the average patent application spends fifty percent of the time at the USPTO waiting in the 
backlog without any attention from a patent examiner”); Michael Bednarek, Responding to 
Recent Trends in the IP Realm: New Considerations for IP Lawyers and Clients, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 2011: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES FOR THE COMING YEAR, 
41 (2011) (noting the recent increasing trend of calls for patent reform); Ryan Desisto, Note, 
Vermont vs. the Patent Troll: Is State Action a Bridge Too Far?, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 109, 125 
(2015) (stating that “[e]ven in this era of extreme partisanship, there is a consensus forming between 
Democrats and Republicans that something must be done to reign in the abusive practices” 
degrading the patent system); Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 887 
(2015) (stating that “the [patent] system is in dire need of reform to restore the previously existing 
balance”). 
 2. See John V. Biernacki, Key Strategies in Drafting Busines Method Patent Claims, in THE 
IMPACT OF BILSKI ON BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING 
CHANGES IN PATENT ELIGIBILITY, COUNSELING CLIENTS POST-BILSKI, AND UNDERSTANDING 
RECENT USPTO GUIDELINES, 2010 WL 6243307, *4 (Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2011 ed., 2010) 
2010 WL 6243307. 
 3. See Bernard Chao, Finding the Point of Novelty in Software Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1217, 1224 (2013); see also Jeremy D. Roux, The Supreme Court and § 101 Jurisprudence: 
Reconciling Subject-Matter Patentability Standards and the Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 629, 658 (2014). 
 4. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, What Should Be Patentable? – A Proposal for 
Determining the Existence of Statutory Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. Section 101, 13 WAKE 
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public storehouse of knowledge” through economic incentives for inventors.5  
However, as economic markets are increasingly interconnected globally, 
coupled with the increased influence of costly litigation on non-participating 
parties, the role of a business entity’s patent litigation strategy stands to shape 
the global market.6  As discussed below, § 101 jurisprudence has evolved a great 
deal within the last decade, a span of years half the statutory duration of patents.7  
Accordingly, an indecisive set of standards determining patent eligibility 
perturbs organizational patent ventures and negatively impacts downstream 
investment, as companies are uncertain whether specific categories of inventions 
will maintain their patent eligibility.8  Further, inconsistencies in court opinions 
regarding patent-eligible subject matter casts doubt on the validity of existing 
patents.9  Such doubt over property rights has the potential to chill the incentive 
to invest in important areas of research and development, decrease “the public 
storehouse of knowledge[,]” stymy the progress of science and technology, and 
negatively affect the United States’ position in the global market.10 
Because § 101 jurisprudence has fallen into chaos a natural reaction is to avoid 
the statute.11  Such a knee jerk response fails to consider significant policy 
implications that only § 101 is capable of serving, neglects a century of patent 
jurisprudence, and wastes a valuable resource that reduces litigation expenses.  
This Comment begins by tracing the history of § 101 jurisprudence and discusses 
how it devolved into the current “morass.”  It further explores how two 
competing theories of § 101 have emerged: the functional viewpoint and the 
jurisdictional viewpoint.12  The functional viewpoint considers the criteria for 
                                                        
FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 149 (2013); see also Yongwook Paik & Feng Zhu, The 
Impact of Patent Wars on Firm Strategy: Evidence from the Global Smartphone Market 2 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-015, 2013), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-
015_8483575c-1f96-4a34-bcbf-c83d99da8959.pdf (“[T]he smartphone industry has spent an 
estimated $20 billion on patent litigations and patent purchases since 2010, and the number of 
district court patent filings has tripled in the last 20 years . . . .”). 
 5. See Sean B. Seymore, Foresight Bias in Patent Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1105, 1145 
(2015). 
 6. See, e.g., Paik & Zhu, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 7. See discussion infra Sections I.C–F. 
 8. See Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of 
Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 45 (2012). 
 9. See Jessica M. Karmasek, U.S. SC Created Confusion with June Patent Decision, Former 
Federal Circuit Judge Says, SE TEXAS RECORD (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://setexas 
record.com/stories/510624477-u-s-sc-created-confusion-with-june-patent-decision-former-
federal-circuit-judge-says (interviewing former Federal Circuit Chief Judge, the Honorable Paul 
Michel). 
 10. See id.; see also Seymore, supra note 5, at 1145 and accompanying text. 
 11. See supra text accompanying notes 4–5, 10; see also David Swetnam-Burland & Stacy 
O. Stitham, Patent Law 101: The Threshold Test as Threshing Machine, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 135, 139–40 (2013). 
 12. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 138–44; see also Tun-Jen Chiang, 
Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858, 1863 (2014) 
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patentability set forth in the Patent Act, including § 101, as tools for weeding 
out non-patentable inventions.13  Continuing with this metaphor, functionalists 
argue that § 101—unlike §§ 102, 103, and 112—is a rusted unworkable device 
that is unable to adequately perform its job.14  Functionalists believe instead that 
courts should avoid § 101 and rely on the more accessible and well-oiled tools 
that are §§ 102, 103, and 112.15  Jurisdictionalists, on the other hand, insist that 
§ 101 stands as a threshold inquiry—a doctrine that maps the scope of patent 
law and must be considered prior to investigating §§ 102, 103, and 112.16 
This Comment argues that the proper role of § 101 is that of threshold inquiry, 
in line with the jurisdictional viewpoint under a legal and policy rationale.  First, 
on legal grounds the jurisdictional viewpoint of § 101 is supported textually in 
how it was promulgated and how it relates to other provisions of the Patent Act.17  
Second, the current trend to decide § 101 disputes at the pleading stage, suggests 
that courts are embracing the jurisdictionalist viewpoint. 18   From a policy 
perspective, courts, by treating § 101 as jurisdictional, effectively lower the cost 
of patent litigation while providing greater opportunity for judicial input from 
the specialized U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and ultimately from 
the U.S. Supreme Court.19 
This Comment proceeds in three parts.  Part I introduces the rationalization of 
patent law, the role § 101 plays, and demonstrates the growing concerns with  
§ 101 jurisprudence.  Part II highlights the competing § 101 philosophies: 
functional versus jurisdictional viewpoints.  Part III argues that § 101 should be 
treated as jurisdictional for legal and policy reasons. 
I.  HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: THE JOURNEY OF § 101 JURISPRUDENCE 
The U.S. Constitution “vests Congress with plenary authority over patents and 
copyrights.” 20   Thomas Jefferson, charged with the task of drafting an 
appropriate statute, relied heavily on the principles of English law21 and sought 
“to promote the progress of science and useful arts . . . by giving the public at 
large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a 
                                                        
(stating that “[t]he reason . . . a theory is needed in [Patentable Subject Matter] law is because . . . 
the rules of [Patentable Subject Matter] law are not self-defining on their face[]”). 
 13. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 136. 
 14. See id. (citing Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by 
Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1674 (2010)). 
 15. See id.  
 16. See id. 
 17. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 18. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 19. See discussion infra Section III.C. 
 20. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 648 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 21. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18 (1829) (noting “[i]t is obvious to the careful 
inquirer, that many of the provisions of our Patent Act are derived from the principles and practice 
which have prevailed in the construction of that of England[]”). 
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period as possible; having a due regard to the rights of the inventor.”22  The 
Patent Act of 1793 embodied this philosophy, defining the patent-eligible 
subject matter to be “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement [thereof].”23  This 
language remained largely unchanged until the patent laws were recodified in 
the 1952 Patent Act.24   Accompanying the 1952 Patent Act is the oft-cited 
legislative quotation, indicating that § 101 should be read to “include anything 
under the sun made by man . . . .”25  Not everything made by man is worth patent 
protection, however, as the inventor must demonstrate, among other things, that 
the invention is novel under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and non-obvious under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103.26 
Further, courts have categorically excluded certain types of inventions from 
protection under § 101.27  Specifically, courts have determined that discoveries 
or inventions drawn to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas 
cannot be considered patent-eligible subject matter. 28   Such discoveries or 
inventions are categorically excluded out of public policy concerns that patent 
protection over such inventions would “impede rather than ‘promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .’”29  The present controversy exists 
                                                        
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, § 1, 1 Stat. 319 (1793) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010)); 
see also In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 24. Congress replaced the term “art” with “process,” as the original term, “art,” essentially 
evolved into the contemporary meaning of “process,” and Congress wanted to avoid confusion.  
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 25. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 
6 (1952)).  It is important to note that the Court modified slightly the quotation, isolating the famous 
quotation from the full text, possibly altering a consummate appreciation of legislative intent.  The 
complete sentence reads: “A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, which may 
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section 
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”  H. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
 26. See Martin D. Lerner, Law Note: In re Lowry and Printed Matter, 77 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 808, 810 (1995) (noting that the determination of whether something is 
patent-eligible or ineligible “has little to do with a priori logic and more to do with making a 
posteriori social and policy decisions look logical and consistent in retrospect”). 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
 28. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) 
(citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); see also 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–602 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–120 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 175 (1852)). 
 29. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185 (“A principle, 
in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no 
one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”); see also Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (“Such 
discoveries are ‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”). 
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because these judicially created exceptions, as Justice Frankfurter once noted, 
are “vague and malleable.”30 
A.  A Look Back at the History and Purpose of § 101 
Despite the recent overhaul to the patent system, transitioning from a first-to-
invent to a first-to-file system,31 Congress elected to leave the words of Thomas 
Jefferson unchanged.32  Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter 
eligible for patent protection as: “[W]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”33 
The antique language of § 101 and the abstractness of the judicially created 
exceptions, coupled with tremendous technological advancements since the late 
eighteenth century, have rendered modern § 101 jurisprudence “in a state of 
flux.”34   Understanding that a newly discovered mineral or Einstein’s mass 
energy equivalence equation is not patentable subject matter35 is not as difficult 
as, for example, determining the eligibility for patenting of business methods,36 
methods for calibrating the proper dosage of drugs to treat autoimmune 
diseases,37 isolated gene sequences,38 or computer software.39 
The purpose of having a patent system is articulated in the Constitution.40  To 
“promote the progress of science and useful arts,” Congress will reward the 
inventor with a limited exclusive right in the form of a patent.41  Thus, an 
inventor is provided a financial incentive for his or her creative efforts with the 
                                                        
 30. Chiang, supra note 12, at 1863 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 
U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 31. See Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable Constitutionality of 
First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (2013) (referencing the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)). 
 32. See Shantanu C. Pathak, The AIA and the First-to-File Provision: Consequences and 
Constitutionality, 28 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 115, 146 (2014). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 34. Roux, supra note 3, at 641.  Historically, inventions or discoveries that fell into judicially 
created categories of patent ineligible subject matter “yielded some of its most enduring, yet most 
complex patent law jurisprudence.”  Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 347, 347 (2012); see also 
Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine 
Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1677 (2010) (stating “the lack of a 
comprehensive definition can also create uncertainty—especially where the volume of case law is 
relatively low”). 
 35. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
 36. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 594–95 (2010). 
 37. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). 
 38. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 
(2013). 
 39. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353 (2014). 
 40. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at 155–56 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 41. Id. 
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right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention, and in return 
the public storehouse of knowledge is enhanced.42  It is universally accepted that 
the patent regime is grounded in utilitarian considerations and is dedicated to 
incentivize “inventions that would otherwise not materialize . . . .”43  Although 
not explicitly mentioned in the language of § 101, determining what is patent-
eligible subject matter strikes an important balance between normal marketplace 
pressures facilitating innovative advancement and overbroad restraints on 
research and development.44  If the statute is read narrowly, the incentive fails 
to achieve its primary purpose: to promote the advancement in the scientific and 
technical fields.45  If the statute is read broadly, the right to exclude creates 
economic barriers, inhibiting others from engaging in innovative endeavors.46  
The judicially created exceptions, which exclude from patentability laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas, serve the balancing objective to 
promote innovation.47  Courts have accepted the responsibility of determining 
what inventions are patent-eligible.48 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Trilogy: Benson, Flook, and Diehr 
Over a nine-year period, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a trio of patent-
eligibility cases—Gottschalk v. Benson,49 Parker v. Flook,50 and Diamond v. 
Diehr.51  Collectively, the trilogy of cases is considered a judicial “guidepost[,]” 
shepherding the  eligibility determination process for patents per § 101.52 
At issue in Benson was whether a method that used an algorithm to convert 
binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary codes was a patent-eligible 
process.53  The Supreme Court considered the algorithm to have no application 
                                                        
 42. Id. 
 43. See Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian 
Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 901 (2009).  Patents “represent[] a 
compromise [between] the public’s right to access new technologies and the private rights of 
innovators.”  Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 50 
(2012). 
 44. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at 157. 
 45. See Davis S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 194 (2009). 
 46. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 4, at 159. 
 47. Id. at 160. 
 48. See Susan J. Marsnik & Robert E. Thomas, Drawing a Line in the Patent Subject-Matter 
Sands: Does Europe Provide A Solution to the Software and Business Method Patent Problem, 34 
B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227, 241 (2011) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 195–98 
(1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 49. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 50. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 51. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 52. See Dave Syrowik, Bridging the Gap Between the Abstract and Real Worlds of Patent 
Eligibility Using the “Guideposts” of Bilski, 90 MICH. B.J., July 2011, at 27, 28 (2011) (referencing 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010)). 
 53. See Syrowik, supra note 52, at 29 (referencing Benson, 409 U.S. at 64). 
2016] Patent-eligible Subject Matter 779 
outside a general purpose computer, and thus the “practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.”54  Algorithms, like scientific truths, are laws of 
nature, regarded as a discovery of a fundamental truth rather than an invention, 
and thus not patent-eligible subject matter. 55  Benson’s claims, the court 
elaborated, “purport[ed] to cover any use of the claimed method in a general 
purpose digital computer.” 56   Notably, the Court decided that eligibility 
determinations of computer-implemented algorithms should be made on a case-
by-case basis, rather than create a bright line rule that would govern method 
claims directed to a computer.57 
The Flook Court investigated the patent eligibility of method claims designed 
to calculate and adjust an “alarm limit in a catalytic conversion of 
hydrocarbons.” 58   The claims were directed broadly to a computer, 
encompassing nearly any use of respondent’s formula, even a mental 
computation of the equation.59  The only difference between the respondent’s 
invention and existing methods of adjusting alarm limits in catalytic converters 
was the respondent’s novel algorithm.60  The Court determined, noting the lack 
of any physical, tangible elements, the method claims ineligible under § 101 
because the respondent’s application contained no patentable inventions despite 
the novelty of the algorithm and its inventive implementation on a computer.61 
In the trilogy’s finale, Diehr, the Supreme Court investigated the eligibility of 
a claimed method that utilized an algorithm to calculate the optimal duration and 
temperature of a process for turning uncured synthetic rubber into cured 
precision products.62  The Court concluded that the claimed method in Diehr, 
unlike the methods reviewed in Benson and Flook, was indeed patent-eligible 
subject matter because the claims, “considered as a whole,”63 did not “foreclose 
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in 
their claimed process.”64  Therefore, the implementation of an algorithm in a 
claimed invention does not itself disqualify the invention as patent-eligible 
subject matter.  The inquiry rests, rather, on how the algorithm is implemented 
                                                        
 54. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72. 
 55. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1055 (1990). 
 56. Id. at 1056 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). 
 57. See id. at 1062. 
 58. See Syrowik, supra note 52, at 29 (referencing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978)). 
 59. See Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software, Are There Still Diehr or Was 
it Just a Flook?, 6 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 363, 379, 380 (1993) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 586). 
 60. See id. at 379 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 585–86). 
 61. See id. (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594); see also Syrowik, supra note 52, at 29–30 
(“‘[I]nsignificant’ post-solution activity to an otherwise” patent-ineligible process or method does 
not “transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”) (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 
590). 
 62. See Syrowik, supra note 52, at 30 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177–79). 
 63. See Strobos, supra note 59, at 381 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)). 
 64. See id. at 387 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187); see also Syrowik, supra note 52, at 30. 
780 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:773 
or applied in a process; specifically, whether the algorithm “transform[s] and 
reduce[s] . . . an article ‘[in]to a different state or thing,’”65 to the point claims 
no longer preclude the “use of manual labor or thought to perform the same 
task.”66 
C.  The Patent “Gold Rush” 
After Diehr, § 101 cases flooded the docket of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit—the appellate court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
over patent cases—and the Federal Circuit, relying heavily on the language of 
the Diehr opinion, broadened the scope of § 101.67  Notably, in State Street Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,68 the Federal Circuit determined 
that the exception for business method claims, which were considered 
previously patent-ineligible subject matter, had met its demise.69 
In State Street, the Federal Circuit examined a claimed computer software 
program that pooled several mutual funds into a portfolio, consolidated 
administration costs, and provided certain taxation advantages.70  The appellate 
court fashioned a new study, extending patent protection to claimed methods 
that yield a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”71 
Shortly thereafter, citing the “useful, concrete, and tangible” language of State 
Street, the Federal Circuit in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,72 
determined that a claimed method for billing long-distance and inter-provider 
phone calls by inserting a “data field” into a standard phone record 73—an 
invention only involving the transfer of data—was patent-eligible subject 
matter.74  The court justified this sweeping change to patent jurisprudence as a 
natural reaction to technological advances and “stand[s] as a testament to the 
ability of law to adopt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to 
basic principles.”75 
                                                        
 65. See Strobos, supra note 59, at 377. 
 66. Id. at 386; see also Syrowik, supra note 52, at 30. 
 67. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 86 (3d ed.  2009). 
 68. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 69. See id. at 1375. 
 70. See id. at 1371; see also Robert Hulse, Patentability of Computer Software After State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.: Evisceration of the Subject Matter 
Requirement, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 491, 509 (2000). 
 71. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 
1994)); see Hulse, supra note 70, at 511. 
 72. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 73. Id. at 1354. 
 74. See id. at 1358 (“‘That respondents’ claims involve the transformation of an article . . . 
into a different state or thing cannot be disputed . . . [and] [t]herefore, we do not find in the claim 
any kind of data transformation.”) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981)); see also 
ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 87–88. 
 75. AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1356. 
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As a result of AT&T, the judicially created exceptions to subject matter 
eligibility became so narrow in relevance that the exception only applied when 
a claimed method existed solely in the abstract.76  The synthesis of the State 
Street and AT&T opinions virtually obliterated the filter of § 101, leading to a 
“gold rush” on patent applications from inventors representing diverse 
backgrounds.77 
Although the influence of the § 101 filter began to diminish, difficult 
questions remained as to whether certain classes of inventions deserved patent 
protection.  State Street, in particular, incited a passionate response within the 
patent community from those who believed the Federal Circuit’s decision 
compromised the entire integrity of the patent system.78  In addition, questions 
concerning business method patents persisted, and the Federal Circuit had to 
determine the influence of the State Street decision on inventions of the digital 
age.79 
1.  Bilski 
In 2008 the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), citing § 101, refused to 
grant a method patent in the case of In re Bilski.80  As Bilski percolated up to the 
Supreme Court, many considered it an opportunity to bridle the expanding scope 
of patentable subject matter.81  Although the Court did not specifically overrule 
State Street, the opinion exposed a dramatic shift in § 101 jurisprudence,82 
signaling an end of the era of judicial restraint concerning patent reform and 
favoring individual analysis over categorical assessment.83 
Bilski developed a method to hedge the risk of price fluctuations of 
commodities in the energy market.84  The key claims under review were claims 
1 and 485: Claim 1 set out instructions on how to hedge risk and Claim 4 
                                                        
 76. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1356; see also Joseph Robert Brown, Jr., Note, Software 
Patent Dynamics: Software as Patentable Subject Matter after State Street Bank & Trust Co., 25 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 639, 655 (2000). 
 77. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 88. 
 78. Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business Method 
Patents, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431, 446 (2014) (citing Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the 
Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1526–28 (1999); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the 
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1139–40 (1999)). 
 79. La Belle & Schooner, supra note 78, at 456–57. 
 80. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (describing the USPTO’s 
reasoning for refusing patent). 
 81. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 67, at 88; Stefania Fusco, In re Bilski: A Conversation with 
Judge Randall Rader and a First Look at the BPAI’s Cases, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 123, 127 
(2010). 
 82. Fusco, supra note 81, at 127–28. 
 83. La Belle & Schooner, supra note 78, at 458–59. 
 84. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010). 
 85. See id. 
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consolidated the steps articulated in Claim 1 into an algorithm.86  The patent 
examiner denied Bilski’s application, citing § 101, as merely an attempt to 
manipulate an abstract idea—solving an algorithm with no limitation in 
application. 87   On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the examiner’s 
rejection, but reached its conclusion on different grounds.88  The Federal Circuit 
created the “machine-or-transformation test,” finding the useful, concrete, and 
tangible test inadequate for § 101 purposes.89  Applying this new framework, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s § 101 rejection, concluding that the claimed 
invention failed to “transform any article to a different state or thing.”90 
The Supreme Court affirmed, but disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s 
construction of a single categorical rule for determining patent-eligible subject 
matter. 91   The Supreme Court considered the Federal Circuit’s use of the 
“machine-or-transformation” test as the only inquiry for determining the 
eligibility of a process as patent-eligible subject matter to be premature. 92  
Although the Supreme Court considered the “machine-or-transformation test” 
an important investigative tool for determining whether a process passes § 101 
muster, the Court believed it should not be relied upon solely as the exclusive 
test.93  The Court, however, did not indicate what the § 101 framework should 
be. 
The Bilski Court’s rejection of a bright line rule and its heavy reliance on cases 
from the 1970s and 1980s revitalized the § 101 debate.94  Furthermore, its failure 
to elucidate a workable § 101 framework effectively punted the uncertainty of 
patent-eligible subject matter down to the lower courts.95  With no ascertainable 
                                                        
 86. See id. 
 87. See Stephen Pessagno, Comment, Prometheus and Bilski: Pushing the Bounds of 
Patentable Subject-Matter in Medical Diagnostic Techniques With the Machine-or-Transformation 
Test, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 619, 628 (2010). 
 88. See id. 
 89. A process claim is considered patentable subject matter only “if 1) it is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.”  Richard 
M. Lee, Beta-Testing the “Particular Machine”: The Machine-or-Transformation Test in Peril and 
Its Impact on Cloud Computing, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 175, 177 (2012) (citing In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Fusco, supra note 81, at 128; Pessagno, supra note 
87, at 628. 
 90. Pessagno, supra note 87, at 629 (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(en banc). 
 91. See Vernon M. Winters & Nicholas A. Brown, Emerging Lessons from the Patentability 
Wars, 58 FED. LAW. 44, 45 (2011). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604–06 (2010). 
 94. See Winters & Brown, supra note 91, at 45. 
 95. See Crouch & Merges, supra note 34, at 1677 (noting the Court’s attempt to avoid the 
potential harms of a categorical rule); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness 
and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity 
to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1304 (2011) (stating 
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framework, scattered opinions from different jurisdictions continued to 
challenge the Federal Circuit’s understanding of the overall purpose of § 101. 
D.  Mayo and the Requirement of the “Inventive Step”: A Rational Deduction 
with No Definition 
Prometheus, an innovator of pharmaceutical research and diagnostics 
products,96 determined the exact concentrations, correlations, and efficacy of 
certain thiopurine drugs in the treatment of autoimmune diseases, such as 
Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. 97   The correlative nature of certain 
metabolites, substances formed in or necessary for metabolic reaction, and their 
general efficacy in the treatment of certain diseases were well documented in the 
scientific community.98  The exact numerical correlations, however, remained 
uncertain. 99   Such calculations largely eluded scientists and health care 
professionals because individuals metabolize compounds at different rates.100  
An individual with an active metabolism may be at higher risk of negative side-
effects when more metabolites hit the blood stream, while an individual with a 
slower metabolism could render treatment ineffective when too little of the 
metabolite reaches the bloodstream.101 
The patents in question in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs 
embody the tremendous discovery of an exact and efficient correlation, along 
with the need to alter treatment based on the metabolite concentrations.102  In 
2004, Mayo Laboratories announced the production and sale of a similar test 
that measured the efficacy of the metabolites with slightly different levels.  In 
response, Prometheus filed an infringement suit.103  Upon review, the district 
court determined that the patent was invalid because the metabolite correlations 
embodied were simply a natural phenomenon and therefore were preempted by 
§ 101.104  On appeal, the Federal Circuit relied solely on the pre-Bilski “machine-
                                                        
“[t]he Supreme Court’s methodology and analysis for determining whether a process falls within 
the scope of patentable subject matter could hardly be more opaque”). 
 96. Prometheus Laboratories, a San Diego based company focused on gastroenterological and 
oncological therapeutics, specializes in the use of serologic, genetic, and inflammation markers to 
assist in identification and diagnosis of gastrointestinal issues, such as autoimmune disorders 
Crohn’s disease or ulcerative colitis.  See Angela L. Morrison, Mayo v. Prometheus: Patent 
Eligibility of Claims Covering Natural Laws, 41 COLO. LAW. 77, 78–79 (2012). 
 97. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–95 
(2012); see also Douglas L. Rogers, After Prometheus, Are Human Genes Patentable Subject 
Matter?,11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 434, 450–51 (2013); see also Morrison, supra note 96, at 79. 
 98. See Morrison, supra note 96, at 79; see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
 99. See Morrison, supra note 96, at 79. 
 100. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See Rogers, supra note 97, at 451. 
 103. See Morrison, supra note 96, at 79. 
 104. See id. at 79–80. 
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or-transformation” test and reversed.105  Provided that the Supreme Court had 
already ruled that the “machine or transformation test” cannot be the exclusive 
§ 101 inquiry, the Supreme Court granted Mayo’s petition for certiorari and 
remanded the case.106 
On remand, the Federal Circuit largely ignored the Supreme Court by using 
the same pre-Bilski inquiry and again concluding that the patent was invalid. 107  
The Supreme Court once again granted certiorari.108 
Upon review, the Supreme Court considered whether Prometheus’s claims 
accomplished more than a mere description of a molecular correlation, a natural 
law.109  The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the claimed process of 
calculating the correlative nature of certain metabolites, which assist in the 
treatment of autoimmune disorders, “effectively claim the underlying laws of 
nature,”110 as the relationship exists independent of human intervention.111  The 
Court considered the claimed administering step, a step referring to doctors who 
had knowledge of the treatment benefits of thiopurine drugs for autoimmune 
disorders, “consist[ed] of well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
already engaged in by the scientific community; and those steps, when viewed 
as a whole, add nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken 
separately.” 112   The Court then indicated that in order to “transform an 
unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one 
must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply 
it.’”113  Implicit in this rationale is the requirement of an “inventive step.”114 
Following the Mayo decision, commentators observed a growing sentiment 
that the Court created more confusion than clarity.115  What exactly constitutes 
an “inventive step?”116  The Court hinted that an “inventive step” is something 
                                                        
 105. See id. at 80. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 
(2012)). 
 110. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
 111. See id. at 1296–97. 
 112. Id. at 1298. 
 113. Id. at 1294. 
 114. See Brittany Ngo, Experts Look at the Meaning of Myriad Case, One Year Later, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/09/16/experts-look-at-the-meaning 
-of-myriad-one-year-later/. 
 115. See Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (2012) (claiming 
that the Mayo decision “‘creates a framework for patent eligibility in which almost any method 
claim can be invalidated’”) (citing Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court’s 
Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), http:// www.patentlyo. 
com/patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supreme-courts-blunders-in-mayo-v-
prometheus.html). 
 116. See Brandon Smith, The Patentability of Human Embryonic Stem Cells in Light of 
Myriad, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 112, 136 (2014). 
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more than a mere discovery, something that inculcates knowledge to the public; 
but it did not elaborate further.117  Many commentators speculated that without 
further guidance on what is patent-eligible subject matter, the growing 
uncertainty would dissuade bioresearch companies from investing in important 
scientific innovation as research and development became increasingly 
intertwined with aggressive litigation strategies.118  This uncertainty trickled 
over to another field of biomedical research: the field of genetics, wherein the 
claims in question elevated the patent-eligible subject matter inquiry from a 
public policy consideration to a moral consideration. 
E.  A Myriad of Problems: Questionable Scientific Justification and Moral 
Concern119 
For decades, many believed breast and ovarian cancer had a genetic 
component. 120   Myriad Genetics, a private molecular diagnostics company, 
confirmed this hypothesis by discovering the precise location and sequence of 
the incriminating genes, known as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.121  In the 
event either gene is affected by a genetic mutation, an alteration of a nucleotide 
sequence, a woman’s chances of developing breast cancer increases 
significantly. 122   This discovery enabled Myriad to develop genetic 
examinations to determine a female’s genetic propensity towards developing 
                                                        
 117. See Robert R. Sachs, Breyer’s Reinvention of the ‘Inventive Concept’, BILSKI BLOG (June 
6, 2013), http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2013/06/breyers-reinvention-of-the-inventive-concept. 
html. 
 118. See JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, MAYO V. PROMETHEUS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PATENTS, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 9 (2012) (stating 
that the “lack of clarity [in Prometheus] may discourage firms that need to support costly research 
and development programs in the area of diagnostics”). 
 119. Why Myriad became front page news was not the existence of an unbelievable fact 
pattern; rather, it was the public’s realization that Myriad’s actions, barring invalidation of their 
patents, were legal. See Ngo, supra note 114 (stating “[t]he science at issue . . . is relatively simple, 
compared to more complex issues in genetics such as genetic modification and activation.”). 
However, as explained by Amelia Rinehard, law professor at the University of Utah, the public’s 
attention of patentable subject matter was not a result of Myriad’s restriction of contemporary 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostics, rather it was the realization that Myriad’s was acting well within 
the bounds of their legal rights. See id. 
 120. J. Mackay & C. M. Szecsei, Genetic Counselling for Hereditary Predisposition to 
Ovarian and Breast Cancer, 21 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 334 (2010), http://annonc.oxfordjournals. 
org/content/21/suppl_7/vii334.long (“A strong family history of breast and/or ovarian cancer has 
long been recognized as a risk factor and is in some cases indicative of a germline mutation.”). 
 121. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2112 
(2013). 
 122. Id. (detailing that a mutation “can be as small as the alteration of a single nucleotide . . . 
[or as large as the] deletion, rearrangement, or duplication of hundreds or even millions of 
nucleotides”).  Increasing odds of developing breast cancer rise from twelve/thirteen percent to 
between fifty and eighty percent if a mutation is discovered, and between twenty and fifty percent 
for ovarian cancer.  See id. 
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breast or ovarian cancer.123   In turn, Myriad obtained a number of patents 
covering “both isolated human gene sequences and isolated human DNA 
molecules.”124  Isolated DNA, unlike naturally occurring chromosomal DNA, 
can be used to detect a particular DNA sequence, such as BRCA1 and BRCA2 
mutations.125 
The natural human genome consists of twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, 
totaling forty-six individual chromosomes. 126   The individual chromosomes 
consist of DNA, proteins, and RNA.127  All genetic material located within the 
DNA is stored in a code made up of four base pairs: adenine (A), guanine (G), 
cytosine (C), and thymine (T).128  The production of proteins from DNA occurs 
in two steps: transcription and translation.129  DNA is “transcribed” into RNA, a 
singular stranded compound.130  Introns, or non-coding regions of the RNA, are 
excised from the RNA through a natural process called “splicing,” which 
produces messenger RNA (or mRNA), a sequence consisting only of exons.131 
Proteins are synthesized from the mRNA templates.132 
Myriad’s discovery represented a tremendous advancement in cancer 
treatment.  However, once Myriad began issuing cease and desist letters in an 
attempt to eliminate competing laboratories from providing lifesaving medical 
services, health care providers made sure Myriad’s hostile litigation strategy 
became public.133  In 2009, a group of doctors, researchers, patients, and medical 
organizations filed a declaratory judgment action against Myriad seeking to 
invalidate its patents on § 101 grounds, arguing that isolated DNA is a product 
of nature and therefore cannot be patentable subject matter.134  The district court 
                                                        
 123. See id. 
 124. Oren Ginsberg, Unwinding the DNA Double-Helix: An Alternate Resolution to the 
Federal Circuit’s Decision in Association for Molecular Pathology for Simplifying § 101 Patent 
Eligibility Determinations, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 563, 566 (2013); see also Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2113. 
 125. See Tup Ingram, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.: The 
Product of Nature Doctrine Revisited, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 385, 400 (2014). 
 126. See Ginsberg, supra note 124, at 567. 
 127. See id. at 566–67. 
 128. See id. at 566. 
 129. See id. at 567. 
 130. See Rogers, supra note 97, at 489. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Id. (“[M]RNA is translated into the encoded proteins ‘via three nucleotide combinations 
called codons.’ Each codon results in the production of one of the twenty amino acids that make up 
all proteins or a stop signal that terminates protein creation.”). 
 133. Julia Carbone & E. Richard Gold, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 
GENETICS IN MEDICINE S38, S41, S43 (2010), http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/v12/n1s/pdf/ 
gim2010142a.pdf. 
 134. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 186–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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agreed with plaintiffs and invalidated Myriad’s patents on summary 
judgment.135  Myriad appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed.136 
Cognizant of the moral and policy issues, Judge Lourie, writing on behalf of 
the majority, began his opinion by cataloging the issues that were not on appeal 
in Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark 
Office.137  Judge Lourie then isolated the inquiry to the dispassionate question: 
“whether the claims to isolated BRCA DNA, to methods for comparing DNA 
sequences, and to a process for screening potential cancer therapeutics meet the 
threshold test for patent-eligible subject matter.”138 
Relying on the principles of Diamond v. Chakrabarty139 and Funk Brothers 
Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company,140 the Federal Circuit intended to 
set out a workable framework for determining patent-eligible subject matter.141  
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court reversed the PTO’s rejection of a patent 
application claiming a genetically engineered bacterium designed to degenerate 
hydrocarbons and assist in cleaning up oil spills.142  The Chakrabarty Court 
determined that the inventor “ha[d] produced a new bacterium with markedly 
different characteristics from any found in nature.”143  The claims, drawn to a 
living organism, were “not nature’s handiwork,” and therefore patent-eligible 
subject matter.144  In Funk Brothers, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal 
Circuit, finding that a non-mutually inhibitive root-nodule bacterium utilized to 
assist seeds in the binding of nitrogen was patent-ineligible.145  The invention 
was simply an “aggregation of [a] select strain[] . . . into one product [which] is 
an application of that newly-discovered natural principle.”146  Despite the utility 
of the discovery, the court felt the mere “combination [of different bacteria 
strains] does not improve . . . their natural functioning.”147 
                                                        
 135. See id. at 185. 
 136. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 137. See id. at 1324 (stating that this case “is not about whether individuals suspected of having 
an increased risk of developing breast cancer are entitled to a second opinion . . . [or] whether is it 
desirable for one company to hold a patent or license covering a test that may save people’s lives, 
or for other companies to be excluded from the market encompassed by such a patent”). 
 138. Id. at 1324. 
 139. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 140. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 141. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314–18; see also Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130–32. 
 142. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305–06. 
 143. Id. at 309–10 (determining the bacterium’s “claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of 
human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”) (citing Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 
121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
 144. Id. at 310. 
 145. See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128–29, 132. 
 146. Id. at 131. 
 147. Id. 
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Drawing on these foundational principles, the Federal Circuit in Myriad held 
that the product of nature doctrine turns on the “distinction . . . in the claimed 
composition’s identity compared with what exists in nature.” 148   Myriad’s 
claims drawn to isolated DNA and isolated genes, on a chemical level, are 
different from native DNA located within human bodies as a result of the 
isolation process.149  Because Myriad’s isolated DNA is different in “name, 
character, and use” than that of native DNA, the Federal Circuit determined that 
isolated DNA is patent-eligible subject matter.150 
On review, rather than addressing the issue as Judge Lourie identified, which 
highlighted the chemical alteration of DNA during the isolation process, “the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on one issue: ‘Are human genes 
patentable?’”151  The Supreme Court focused instead on the textual descriptions 
of Myriad’s patent claims. 152  According to Justice Thomas, writing for the 
majority, the destruction of the covalent bonds—as relied upon by Judge 
Lourie—did not save Myriad because its claims focused on the information 
contained within the DNA sequence, not on the chemical composition of the 
isolated sequence. 153   Returning to Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, the 
Supreme Court likened the isolation of BRCA1 and BRCA2 to the Funk 
Brothers patent-ineligible discovery of a mixed culture of mutually non-
inhibited strains of root nodule bacteria, an ingenious discovery, but 
nevertheless, by itself did not transform the natural phenomenon—isolated DNA 
sequences—into patent-eligible subject matter.154 
The varying degrees of expertise on technical and biological matters are 
readily apparent in comparing the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court opinions 
in the Myriad case.  While Judge Lourie—holding a master’s degree in organic 
chemistry and a Ph.D. in chemistry155—methodically chronicled the chemical 
                                                        
 148. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1327–
28 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Ingram, supra note 125, at 405. 
 149. See Ginsberg, supra note 124, at 567.  “Native DNA exists in the human body as one of 
forty-six adjoined DNA molecules.  Isolated DNA and isolated genes comprise a portion of an 
entire DNA molecule, with the sugar-phosphate backbone chemically severed or cleaved.”  Id. 
 150. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d at 1329 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012) (citing Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309–10); see also Ingram, supra note 125, at 405. 
 151. Ingram, supra note 125, at 406 (citing Order Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694, 695 (2012)).  Justice 
Thomas, writing the unanimous opinion of the court, characterized the exclusive authority to 
synthetically create BRCA cDNA in upholding the validity of such patents, as well as the 
monopolistic actions taken by Myriad to solidify their position as the singular entity capable of 
proving BRCA testing.  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2107, 2113 (2013). 
 152. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117–18. 
 153. See id. at 2118.  The Court noted that several of Myriad’s patent descriptions merely 
specify the scientific “iterative process” of their breakthrough. Id. 
 154. See id. at 2117. 
 155. Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.ca 
fc.uscourts.gov/judges/alan-d-lourie-circuit-judge (last visited on June 27, 2016). 
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structure of DNA and the subsequent alteration of that chemical structure in 
practicing Myriad’s claimed invention, the late Justice Scalia, in concurrence, 
went as far as to admit his personal scientific inadequacies in reaching his 
conclusion. 156   Moreover, the Federal Circuit opinion appears to be more 
consistent with then contemporaneous § 101 jurisprudence, while the Supreme 
Court relies on striking a like comparison from a patent decision from the middle 
of the twentieth century. 
The Myriad decision remains subject to strong criticism due to its inconsistent 
scientific rationale,157 unsupported legal analysis,158 and continued failure to 
articulate a meaningful framework for § 101 analysis.159  The analysis grew 
more uncertain, requiring a degree of inventiveness somewhere between the 
patent-eligible invention of Chakrabarty and the patent-ineligible inventions of 
Funk Brothers.160 
F.  Alice: The Requirement of an Inventive Step Across Subject Matter 
Eligibility Inquiries 
Alice Corporation holds several patents for mitigating the risk that one party 
associated with a financial exchange will fail to satisfy its monetary 
obligation.161  Alice Corporation’s particular method of mitigating risk, known 
as the settlement risk, is implemented on a computer configured to carry out the 
                                                        
 156. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am unable to affirm those [fine] 
details [of molecular biology] on my own knowledge or even my own belief. It suffices for me to 
affirm, having studied the opinions below and the expert briefs presented here . . . .”). 
 157. Steven Salzberg, Professor of Biomedical Engineering, Computer Science, and 
Biostatistics in the Institute of Genetic Medicine at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Medicine, 
quickly pointed out several scientific errors in the first paragraph of the Courts opinion. Steven 
Salzberg, Supreme Court Gets Decision Right, Science Wrong, on Gene Patents, FORBES (Jun. 13, 
2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevensalzberg/2013/06/13/supreme-court-gets-deci 
sion-right-science-wrong/#2d0bc7612cc3.  As Salzberg notes, the court’s understanding that 
nucleotides that code are exons is somewhat rudimentary, as “nucleotides that code for amino acids 
are contained within the exons, but they are not the same thing.  It’s not unusual for [twenty-five 
percent] or even [fifty percent] of the nucleotides in the exons to be ignored when making amino 
acids.”  Id.  In addition, the court incorrectly defined composite DNA, synthetically created stands 
of nucleotides consisting only of exons as “cDNA.”  See id.  cDNA actually stands for 
complementary DNA, replicate DNA stands consisting of those nucleotides that complement the 
original nucleotide (A compliments T, C compliments G, and vice versa).  See id. 
 158. See Ingram, supra note 125, at 411; see also Samantak Ghosh, Are All Genes Equal?, 20 
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 13 (2014) (finding “studies have shown that gene patents may have 
negative impact on clinical diagnostics, [but] there is otherwise very little evidence to support the 
contention that gene patents inhibit downstream innovation in general”); see also Smith, supra note 
116, at 125 (noting that the rationale supporting the Court’s decision in Myriad my render isolated 
proteins, whose nucleotide sequence mirrors that of those natural occurring, no longer patent-
eligible subject matter). 
 159. See Jake Gipson, Patentable Subject Matter: A Myriad of Problems, 65 ALA. L. REV. 815, 
826 (2014). 
 160. See Ingram, supra note 125, at 411. 
 161. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014). 
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method for exchanging method obligations using a third party intermediary.162  
In 2007, CLS Bank sought declaratory judgment against Alice Corp., arguing 
the patent claims were invalid under § 101.163  A divided panel of the Federal 
Circuit reversed a district court decision on grounds that the claims were not 
“manifestly evident” to be drawn to an abstract idea.164  Reviewing en banc, a 
fractured Federal Circuit vacated the three-person panel and issued a one-
paragraph per curiam opinion affirming the lower court’s decision that the 
patent is invalid under § 101.165 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Federal Circuit, 
finding “that the claims at issue are drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated 
settlement.”166  Because a claim drawn to an abstract idea is not probative of 
patent ineligibility, the Court further investigated the claims to determine the 
existence of an “inventive concept,” as described in Mayo. 167   Relying on 
Benson, the Court reasoned that the implementation of an algorithm, or any other 
abstract idea, onto a “general purpose digital computer” does “not supply the 
necessary inventive concept.”168  Therefore, the patent was invalid as it was 
drawn to ineligible subject matter.169  This broadened the ambiguous “inventive 
step” test, set forth in Mayo, to all claims that are drawn to products of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.170  But the Court yet again refused to 
precisely delineate what an abstract idea is, and provided no further guidance 
than the prior case law.171 
A quick look at the procedural history of the Alice case illustrates the 
confusion surrounding § 101.  The patent in question was invalidated by the 
                                                        
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. at 2353. 
 164. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 165. See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en 
banc). 
 166. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2352. 
 167. See id. at 2357 (detailing the rule that “[a] claim that recites an abstract idea must include 
‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize 
the [abstract idea]’”) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1294 (2012)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 2360. 
 170. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination 
Policy, to Patent Examining Corps 1 (June 25, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/announce/ 
alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf (noting that prior to Alice Corp., the USPTO previously applied a 
different analysis to claims directed to abstract ideas and claims directed to laws of nature, as well 
as a different analysis to product and process claims that are directed to an abstract idea). 
 171. See, e.g., E-mail from American Intellectual Property Law Association to the Honorable 
Michelle K. Lee, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Deputy 
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 3 (July 31, 2014), http://www.us 
pto.gov/sites/default/files/patents/law/comments/al-a-aipla20140731.pdf (referencing Alice Corp. 
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014)).  As Justice Thomas indicates in the 
Myriad opinion, the high court does not set forth “the framework,” just “a framework.”  Id. 
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district court, reversed on appeal, vacated by a fractured Federal Circuit sitting 
en banc, and ultimately invalidated by the Supreme Court.172  As Professor 
Dennis Crouch exhorted, “[i]t is simply ridiculous that after [forty] years of 
debate, we still do not have an answer to the simple question of whether (or 
when) software is patentable.”173 
Despite the increase in Supreme Court attention to patent jurisprudence, 
confusion over § 101 persists.174  Inventors, patent applicants, lower courts, and 
litigants continue to seek clarification and consistency. 
II.  THE FUNCTIONAL V. JURISDICTIONAL PHILOSOPHIES: THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL VIEWPOINTS OF § 101 ANALYSIS 
So, what can be done with § 101?  David Swetnam-Burland and Stacy O. 
Stitham detailed the two major § 101 philosophies: the functional understanding 
and the jurisdictional understanding.175  The viewpoints drastically differ on the 
role § 101 should play in a court’s determination of patent-eligible subject 
matter. 
Functionalists view § 101 pragmatically, as an untrustworthy filter that should 
only be used in the direst of cases.  Functionalists, in other words, treat § 101 as 
a backstop. 176   Jurisdictionalists, disagree with the minimization of § 101.  
Instead, they consider the § 101 question to be a threshold inquiry that must be 
considered prior to investigating other patent invalidity arguments, such as 
anticipation under § 102 or obviousness under § 103.177  Jurisdictionalists further 
believe that § 101 maps the boundaries of patent law, and stands “as the only 
barricade against invasive species that periodically threaten to overwhelm the 
patent ecosystem.”178 
A.  Functional Philosophy 
An obvious response to mitigate the confusion surrounding the “morass” of  
§ 101 is to essentially eliminate it and relying on existing alternatives.179  The 
functional proposal suggests: “[T]he courts should exercise their authority to 
manage litigation to privilege the other validity defenses (anticipation, 
                                                        
 172. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text. 
 173. Dennis Crouch, Ongoing Debate: Is Software Patentable?, PATENTLY-O (July 27, 2012), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/07/ongoing-debate-is-software-patentable.html. 
 174. See Ronny Valdes, Stare Indecisis: The Federal Circuit’s En Banc Battle Against Itself 
and Business in Lighting Ballast Control, LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp., 4 AM. 
U. BUS. L. REV. 63, 92 (2015). 
 175. See generally Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 138–44. 
 176. Id. at 136. 
 177. Id. at 141 (stating that “the jurisdictionalist sees subject matter eligibility as a doctrine 
that is different in kind from anticipation, obviousness, and the other invalidity defenses found in 
Sections 102, 103, and 112”). 
 178. Id. at 141. 
 179. Id. at 138–39. 
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obviousness, indefiniteness, written description, etc.), and insist that litigants 
present those defenses first.”180  As Swetnam-Burland and Stitham explain, the 
frustration caused by § 101 within the judiciary cannot be more apparent than 
Judge Plager’s decision in MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp.181 
In MySpace, Judge Plager compared § 101 jurisprudence to oenologists, 
explaining that trying to define an abstract idea is like describing wine—it 
depends primarily on the individual.182  Judge Plager continued his criticism of 
§ 101 in his dissent in DealerTrack, Inc. v. Huber,183 insisting that the court 
should use its inherent power to avoid entering the “jurisprudential morass of  
§ 101” and consider other statutory defenses; “specifically[,] §§ 102 and 103, 
and in addition §§ 112 and 251. 184   Adopting a doctrine of avoidance, 
theoretically, would streamline the litigious process, as litigation will not be 
bogged down by the uncertainty and likely appeal of a § 101 determination.185  
The significance of § 101 would be lessened, serving only as a dysfunctional 
“backstop” in those “rare cases.”186 
The functional theory assumes that § 101 is a disreputable and insoluble mess; 
avoidance of which would encourage litigants to realize its frivolousness.187  
Supporting this notion of futility, functionalists call attention to studies 
demonstrating that the majority of patent claims rejected as patent-ineligible 
subject matter under § 101 by the USPTO were also denied a patent on other 
grounds.188  The fallacy in this logic, however, is that it assumes vivid clarity of 
other patent doctrines, equates the patent prosecution process undertaken by the 
                                                        
 180. Id. at 139. 
 181. Id. at 153.  In MySpace, Judge Plager lamented: 
In an attempt to explain what an abstract idea is (or is not) we tried the machine or 
transformation” formula—the Supreme Court was not impressed.  We have since 
acknowledged that the concept lacks of a concrete definition: “this court also will not 
presume to define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic 
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible 
subject matter . . . .[.]” 
MySpace, Inc. v. Graphon Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 
 182. Id. at 1259.  Judge Plager also points out that the Court’s “opinions spend page after page 
revisiting our cases and those of the Supreme Court, and still we continue to disagree vigorously 
over what is or is not patentable subject matter.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 183. 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 184. Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 136 n. 4 (referencing DealerTrack, 674 
F.3d at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting)). 
 185. Id. at 139–40. 
 186. Id. at 139. “[C]ases in which ‘it is clear and convincing beyond peradventure’ that a patent 
claim is ‘over the line’ of abstractness that can be caught by the ‘coarse filter’ of Section 101.”  Id. 
(citing MySpace, Inc., 672 F.3d at 1261). 
 187. Id. at 139–40. 
 188. Id. at 139. 
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USPTO with courts’ determination regarding the validity of a patent,189 it rigidly 
requires courts to investigate each possible rejection of a claim190—a practice 
already undertaken by the USPTO191—and would essentially render § 101 a 
“dead letter.”192 
B.  Jurisdictional Philosophy  
The jurisdictional philosophy sees beyond the morass § 101 has become.193  
Instead of considering § 101 a backstop, jurisdictional proponents view § 101 as 
a gatekeeper, a “barricade” or a “tool” designed to weed out bad patents.194  
Jurisdictionalists argue that the text of § 101 and judicial opinions serve as 
evidence of this gatekeeping quality.  For example, the majority and concurring 
opinions in Bilski both label § 101 as a “threshold” question, as have numerous 
other Federal Circuit opinions.195  As a “threshold” inquiry, jurisdictionalists 
believe, it is the primary duty of the courts to decide whether the claimed 
invention is patent-eligible subject matter before considering the more fact-
intensive questions of whether the claim is novel and nonobvious.196 
Further, the jurisdictional approach empowers § 101 to be not only a threshold 
inquiry, but also a question of jurisdiction.197  If courts were to consider both  
§ 101 and subject matter jurisdiction in a similar manner, the § 101 inquiry 
becomes a question courts must consider “even if [it must] make that assessment 
on a sua sponte basis.”198 
                                                        
 189. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 
282 (2012)) (stating “‘[a] patent shall be presumed valid’ and’[t]he burden of establishing invalidity 
of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.’”). 
 190. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 140. 
 191. 706 Rejection of Claims [R-07.2015], Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s706.html (last visited June 27, 2016) (stating “[t]he 
goal of examination is to clearly articulate any rejection early in the prosecution process so that the 
applicant has the opportunity to provide evidence of patentability and otherwise reply completely 
at the earliest opportunity”).  The USPTO’s goal is to articulate any rejection, not a rejection.  See 
id. 
 192. See Morrison, supra note 96, at 81. 
 193. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 140–44. 
 194. Id. at 140–41. 
 195. Id. at 141; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
689 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (identifying 35 U.S.C. § 101 as the “threshold test”); 
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that “§ 101 itself . 
. . is merely a threshold check”) (emphasis added); Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 
659 F.3d 1057, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting the difference between “the threshold inquiry of 
patent-eligibility, and the substantive conditions of patentability”). 
 196. See Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 141. 
 197. See id. at 141 (noting that the jurisdictional view “can be analogized to federal subject 
matter jurisdiction jurisprudence”). 
 198. Id. (citing Diggs v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 670 F.3d 1353, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
794 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 65:773 
1.  The Judicial Authority to Raise Matters Sua Sponte 
The term sua sponte, in legal parlance, “describes a decision or action 
undertaken by a court on its own motion as opposed to an action or decision 
done in response to a party’s request or argument.” 199   Generally, federal 
appellate courts will not consider issues not previously and timely argued by the 
parties either in briefs or at oral arguments. 200   However, the courts retain 
discretion to raise certain issues themselves, a practice occurring more 
frequently in the Federal Circuit.201 
Historically, a court’s power to raise issues sua sponte is rooted in the courts 
of equity, where the supreme duty of the court was to balance the interests before 
granting relief.202  Legal questions are generally designated as questions of facts, 
questions of law, or a combination of the two.203  Because questions of law 
concern the application or interpretation of the law in question, they are excluded 
from the jury and reserved for the court.204  Questions of facts, however, are 
reserved for the finder of fact, typically when the issue involves weighing the 
                                                        
 199. Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte 
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 248 (2002) Sua sponte, as interpreted from 
its original Latin translates to “on his or its own motion.”  Id.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1437 (7th ed. 1999). 
 200. See Melissa M. Devine, When the Courts Save Parties from Themselves: A Practitioner’s 
Guide to the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade, 21 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
329, 330–31 (2013). 
 201. See id. at 331. 
 202. See Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U.S. 299, 301 (1895) (“While patent cases are 
usually disposed of upon bill, answer, and proof, there is no objection, if the patent be manifestly 
invalid upon its face, to the point being raised on demurrer, and the case being determined upon the 
issue so formed.  We have repeatedly held that a patent may be declared invalid for want of novelty, 
though no such defense be set up in the answer.”); Hill v. Wooster, 132 U.S. 693, 698 (1890) (“The 
parties to the present suit appear to have been willing to ignore the question as to patentability in 
the present case, and to have litigated merely the question of priority of invention, on the 
assumption that the invention was patentable.  But neither the Circuit Court nor this court can 
overlook the question of patentability.”); Slawson v. Grand Street, R.R. Co., 107 U.S. 649, 652 
(1883) (“If [letters- patent] are void because the device or contrivance described therein is not 
patentable, it is the duty of the court to dismiss the cause on that ground whether the defence be 
made or not.  It would ill become a court of equity to render a money decree in [favor of a 
complainant] for the infringement of letters-patent which are void on their face for want of 
invention.  Every suitor in such a cause should, therefore, understand that the question whether the 
invention, which is the subject-matter in controversy, is patentable or not is always open to the 
consideration of the court, whether the point is raised by the answer or not.”); see also Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, 
however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of 
patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex 
Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1352–55 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (exemplifying a court’s sua sponte § 101 argument 
as grounds for finding a patent invalid). 
 203. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1985). 
 204. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (10th ed. 2014). 
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credibility of witnesses.205  Questions of law, unlike questions of facts, are more 
likely to be raised by a court sua sponte in the interest of judicial neutrality.206  
Judicial neutrality is preserved when party input is not considered in the 
determination of matters of law and as such should only impact questions of 
law.207 
Over the years, the Federal Circuit has treated a number of patent law 
questions as matters of law, including § 101.208  The Supreme Court has also 
treated § 101 as a threshold matter, most notably in Bilski.209  Another overt 
example is Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite Laboratories.210  The majority 
in Metabolite dismissed the case on grounds that certiorari was “improvidently 
granted.”211  Yet in his dissent, Justice Breyer indicated his position on § 101 
sua sponte in the absence of any previous mention of § 101 by the lower courts 
or the parties. 212   Although a dissenting opinion casts no precedent, it is 
noteworthy that three out of the four justices required to grant certiorari joined 
the dissent of a case dismissed as improvidently granted.213  Further, the Mayo 
opinion’s analysis correlates closely to that of Metabolite’s sua sponte 
opinion.214  This correlation suggests that Metabolite essentially directed the 
Federal Circuit to the Supreme Court’s intentions regarding § 101 analysis, as 
well as supports the belief that current members of the Supreme Court consider 
§ 101 a jurisdictional question.215 
                                                        
 205. See Jesse S. Keene, Fact or Fiction: Reexamining the Written Description Doctrine’s 
Classification as a Question of Fact, 18 FED CIR. B.J. 25, 51 (2008). 
 206. See Milani & Smith, supra note 199, at 304. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See, e.g., Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (“Issues of patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law and are reviewed without 
deference.” (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2011))). 
 209. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (stating that “[t]he § 101 eligibility inquiry 
is only a threshold test”). 
 210. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125–26 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 126, 132–33 (“In my view, we should not dismiss the writ.  The question presented 
is not unusually difficult.  We have the authority to decide it.  We said that we would do so.  The 
parties and amici have fully briefed the question.  And those who engage in medical research, who 
practice medicine, and who as patients depend upon proper health care might well benefit from this 
Court’s authoritative answer.”). 
 213. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s Plenary 
Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 779 (2001) (stating that the “‘Rule of Four’ . . . requires four 
Justices to vote in favor of review before the Court will accept a case on the merits”); see generally 
Lab Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stevens, J. and Souter, J.). 
 214. See Matthew Herder, Choice Patents, 52 IDEA 309, 322 n.41 (2012) (noting that Breyer’s 
Metabolite dissent gained some traction in the Mayo opinions). 
 215. See id. 
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As detailed below, the ability of courts to raise § 101 matters sua sponte plays 
a paramount role in policy considerations.216 
III.  SECTION 101 IS A JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE 
The following section will examine the requirements for patentability, and 
will demonstrate the inherent gatekeeping function of § 101 as compared to  
§§ 102 and 103. 
A.  Section 101 Textual Analysis: Legal Grounds Supporting § 101 as an 
Inquiry of Primary Consideration 
A proper analysis of a statute’s text “starts with the specific words of the 
statutory provision being interpreted.”217   The text should be interpreted by 
considering how the provisions “cohere[] with the general structure of the 
statute.”218  Therefore, to adequately consider how the patentability provisions 
“cohere” within the general structures of the statute, a comparison of the general 
structure of each provision is required.  Simply put, how does § 101 differ from 
its patentability counterparts? 
Again, § 101 reads: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.219 
The statute begins with “[w]hoever invents or discovers,” which serves to 
limit patent protection to “inventors.”220  The statute then proceeds to enumerate 
the types of inventions considered to be eligible for patent protection.  If an 
inventor creates an article that falls into one of the several enumerated 
categories—process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—the 
article is patent-eligible subject matter.221  Section 101, accordingly, may be 
considered a limiting statute, because patent protection is limited to those who 
“invent” certain classes of inventions. 
In contrast, §§ 102 and 103 can be considered limiting factors.  Section 102 
states that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless” it is anticipated,222 and 
§ 103 states “[a] patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained” if it is 
                                                        
 216. See infra Section III.C. 
 217. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354-55 (1990). 
 218. Id. at 355. 
 219. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 220. Id.; John Burke, Examining the Constitutionality of the Shift to “First Inventor to File” 
in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 39 J. LEGIS. 69, 76 (2013) (stating that “[t]he Patent 
Clause prevents Congress from granting patent rights to anyone except inventors”). 
 221. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (stating that the inventor “may obtain a patent therefor”) 
(emphasis added). 
 222. Id. at § 102 (emphasis added). 
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logically deducible by “a person having ordinary skill in the art.”223  Section 101 
itself articulates the difference between its own purpose and that of the other 
requirements: stating that patentability “may obtain a patent therefore, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”224  Section 102, however, does not 
suggest that the provision is subject to additional conditions and requirements 
for patenting, and § 103 only references § 102.225  In other words, § 101’s 
language opens the gate for an inventor while §§ 102 and 103 present ways that 
the gate can be closed. 
Moreover, the legislative intent, coupled with the longstanding doctrine to 
avoid “redundancies” in statutory law, suggests that §§ 102 and 103 are 
amplifiers of § 101—directing the inquiry against prior art.226 
Judge Giles S. Rich,227 co-author of the 1952 Patent Act, treated § 101 as an 
inquiry of first consideration.228  Judge Rich understood the 1952 Patent Act to 
divide the patentability statutes into it “logical components,” a “clearcut” 
intention to clarify “what had been a hodgepodge of separate enactments” into 
three distinct provisions. 229   Judge Rich characterized the provisions as a 
succession of locked doors that must be successfully opened, commencing with 
the opening of § 101.230  Nothing in the legislative history of §§ 102 and 103 
suggests the intent of Congress to modify then existing patent law.231  In addition 
to rather clear legislative history, further support for § 101 standing as a 
gatekeeper with respect to the patentability statutes exists upon consideration of 
how the individual patent statutes interrelate with one another and upon 
examining how their individual functional purpose is accomplished.  For 
example, one could infer from a close reading of the patentability statutes that 
§§ 102 and 103 were born out of § 101; nevertheless, fragments of the inquiry 
                                                        
 223. Id. at § 103 (emphasis added). 
 224. Id. at § 101 (emphasis added). 
 225. See id. at § 102 (beginning with “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . .”); see 
also id. at § 103 (stating that “[a] patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, 
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102”). 
 226. See In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1979).  Unlike §§ 102 and 
103, prior art is entirely irrelevant to a § 101 inquiry.  Id. at 962–63. 
 227. In addition to co-authoring the 1952 Patent Act, Judge Rich was the first patent lawyer to 
sit as a Judge, and is considered by many to be the founding father of modern patent law.  See Oskar 
Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 45-46 (2012); 
George M. Sirilla, 35 U.S.C. § 103: From Hotchkiss to Hand to Rich, The Obvious Patent Law 
Hall-of-Famers, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 437, 514, 525 (1999). 
 228. See Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business Method Patents 
Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 31 (2011) 
(noting the three successive door analogy to patent law). 
 229. See Bergy, 596 F.2d at 959–60. 
 230. See id. at 960. 
 231. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel 
and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 385 
(2002) (stating that the legislative intent was “to codify and clarify existing [patent] law”). 
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remain within the § 101 analysis.232  Section 101 seems to necessitate a novelty 
inquiry—§ 102’s primary purpose—via the use of the term “new.”233  Congress 
never intended, however, to test novelty under § 101, believing it was an inquiry 
historically reserved for § 102.234  To prevent the redundancy between “new,” 
located in § 101, and “novel,” found in § 102, the reading of the former requires 
the subject matter to have never existed, whereas reading of the latter requires 
the subject matter to have never been disclosed previously.235 
Similar to the apparent redundancy between “new” and “novel” found in  
§ 101 and § 102 respectively, § 103’s requirement that the article be nonobvious 
seems to duplicate § 101’s requirement of an “invention.”236  Prior to the 1952 
Patent Act, the nonobvious requirement existed only in the elaboration of  
§ 101’s use of the term “new.”237  It was only after the 1952 Patent Act that the 
requirement of nonobviousness explicitly appears in the statutory language.238  
Section 101, however, again retains some function in determining 
nonobviousness, as Congress did not intend to alter the historical requirements 
of “invention” with the passage of § 103 and the nonobviousness requirement.239 
Section 101 simply broadens the inquiries of §§ 102 and 103 to ascertain 
whether the claimed invention is of the kind contemplated by Congress as 
possibly patentable. 240   In addition, although §§ 102 and 103 direct the 
investigation at prior art, a § 101 inquiry does not address the status of other 
patents, which again represents the inherent structural difference between § 101 
                                                        
 232. See Ognjen Zivojnovic, Patent Law: Patentable Subject Matter after Alice - 
Distinguishing Narrow Software Patents from Overly Broad Business Method Patents, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 818 (highlighting the Mayo Court’s recognition of a perceived 
“‘overlap’ between ‘the § 101 patent eligibility inquiry and . . . the § 102 novelty inquiry’”). 
 233. See In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
 234. The novelty criteria are named in § 101, then amplified and defined in § 102.  See Demaine 
& Fellmeth, supra note 231, at 384. 
 235. It is a well-established doctrine of salutatory interpretation to consider the utility of each 
individual term with the presumption that the legislature does not use redundant, or “superfluous 
words.”  Id. at 385. 
 236. See id. at 381–82. 
 237. See id. at 381 (“Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, patent statutes provided only that inventions 
must be ‘new.’  It was the courts that elaborated on the definition of ‘new’ . . . .”). 
 238. See id. at 382. 
 239. See id. at 381–82. 
The section 103 nonobvious requirement was included in the 1952 Patent Act to provide 
“an explicit statement in the statute” of the judicially created invention requirement in 
order to impart “some stabilizing effect” on judicial determinations of invention “and 
also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be 
worked out.” 
Id.  Congress did not intend to alter the standards of the invention standard; rather, “section 103 
was drafted to distinguish true invention from a mere change in detail . . . .”  Id. at 382. 
 240. See In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 963–64 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“[I]f they turn 
out to be new, useful, and unobvious within the meaning of those terms as used in the statute.”); 
see also Olson, supra note 45, at 195 (2009) (“[C]ourts and the PTO have traditionally ruled that 
particular classes of subject matter are outside the realm of patentability.”). 
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and §§ 102 and 103.  In other words, § 101 proceeds through a categorical 
inquiry, whereas §§ 102 and 103 operate on the subject matter individually.  
Nothing can be more inherently obvious than to investigate the subject matter at 
its genus, before defining it at its species. 
Therefore, the textual interrelationship between the individual statutes, 
coupled with the intention of the co-author of the 1952 Patent Act, undoubtedly 
suggest the legislative intention to establish § 101 as inquiry of first 
consideration. 
B.  Courts Treat § 101 as Jurisdictional 
A recent string of cases suggests a growing understanding by the courts of the 
jurisdictional nature of § 101.  In Ultramercial v. Hulu,241 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a California district court’s grant of a 12(b)(6) motion finding the 
patents in question invalid under § 101.242  In buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,243 
the Federal Circuit again affirmed a Delaware grant of a 12(c) motion finding 
that “the claims [were] directed to an abstract idea.”244  In Planet Bingo, LLC v. 
VKGS, LLC,245 the Federal Circuit affirmed a Michigan district court’s grant of 
summary judgment.246  In Bascom Global Internet Servs. v. AT&T Mobility 
LLC,247 Judge Chen reiterated that courts may “dispose of patent-infringement 
claims under § 101 whenever procedurally appropriate.”248 
In OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,249 Judge Mayer explicitly endorsed 
the threshold and jurisdictional nature of § 101.250  Judge Mayer sanctioned the 
disposal of the case, citing the benefits of expediting litigation—thus sparing 
litigants discovery and claim construction costs—and serving to curb “vexatious 
suits brought by the owners of vague and overbroad . . . patents.”251  In Genetic 
Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.,252 Judge Dyke reaffirmed the Federal Circuit’s 
                                                        
 241. 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 242. Id. at 717 (determining “that the district court did not err in holding that the ‘545 patent 
does not claim patent-eligible subject matter.  Accordingly, the decision of the district court . . . is 
affirmed”). 
 243. 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 244. Id. at 1355. 
 245. 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 246. See id. at 1009. 
 247. 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11687 (Fed. Cir. June 27, 2016). 
 248. Id. at *14. 
 249. 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 250. See id. at 1364–65 (Mayer, J., concurring); see also Dennis Crouch, Eligibility 101: 
Motion to Dismiss Ends Another Patent, PATENTLY-O (June 15, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/ 
patent/2015/06/eligibility-dismiss-another.html. 
 251. See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1364; see also Crouch, Eligibility 101: Motion to Dismiss 
Ends Another Patent, supra note 250. 
 252. 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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position that “in many cases it is possible and proper to determine patent 
eligibility under . . . § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”253 
This recent string of Federal Circuit decisions suggests a shift in the court’s 
conception of § 101, and supports the growing trend of courts considering § 101 
not only as a threshold issue, but a jurisdictional issue. 
C.  Policy Rationale for Treating § 101 as Jurisdictional 
In addition to the legal arguments supporting the jurisdiction viewpoint, there 
are also policy reasons for treating § 101 as jurisdictional. 
Under the utilitarian philosophy of patent law, the purpose of a patent system 
is to incentivize invention and weigh society’s interests in patentability of certain 
subject matter.254  Ideally, patent examiners would individually investigate each 
application to determine whether the right to exclude competition from the 
market will both recoup the cost of research and development and still cultivate 
the advancement of the public storehouse of knowledge.255  Unfortunately, such 
individualistic and comprehensive examination is not feasible.256  Sections 102 
and 103, on their own, fail to ensure efficient examination and are unable achieve 
the utilitarian goals of the U.S. Patent system.257  Sections 102 and 103, rather, 
serve to ensure that the public storehouse of knowledge is adequately increased 
despite the patent system’s public exclusion rights.258  They simply are not 
meant to handle the responsibility of determining which types of articles the 
patent system should consider giving patent protection. 
To increase efficacy, the patent regime must be dedicated to initially 
investigating claims on a categorical approach.259  Such categorically based 
distinctions are best suited to identify and screen out overbroad patents that run 
afoul of the systems utilitarian goals.260  As discussed above, the jurisdictional 
view of § 101 gives the court the authority to raise the matter sua sponte.261  The 
                                                        
 253. Id. at 1373 (noting also that “evaluation of a patent claim’s subject matter eligibility under 
§ 101 can proceed even before a formal claim construction”) (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun 
Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[C]laim construction 
is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.”)). 
 254. See Olson, supra note 45, at 184. 
 255. See id. at 201. 
 256. See id. at 201. 
 257. See id. at 203. 
 258. See id. at 201 (stating that “[i]f it is determined that the incentive of patents is not needed 
for a class of inventions, then it is a waste of time and resources to engage in any of the tests set 
out in sections 102, 103, and 112 of the Patent Act”). 
 259. See id. 
 260. See id. at 195; see also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 231, at 363 (stating “sections 
101, 102, and 103 must be analyzed in order,” and “only sections 102 and 103 ‘guard . . . the public 
interest by assuring that patents are not granted which would take from the public that which it 
already enjoys’”). 
 261. See supra Part I. 
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utilization of such a prerogative would not only increase judicial efficacy, but 
also could assist in the cataloging of developing inventions. 
1.  Avoiding Costly Discovery 
Implicit in the functional viewpoint’s theory is a rigid application of a mandate 
that directs courts to “proceed through discovery to claim construction, followed 
by summary judgment practice where invalidity issues such as anticipation and 
obviousness may be addressed.”262   According to the American Intellectual 
Property Law Association, the cost of a lawsuit where the risk is between 
$1,000,000 and $25,000,000 is, on average, $1,600,000 through the end of 
discovery, and $2,800,000 through final disposition of the case.263 
E-discovery is the primary culprit,264 as well as extensive prior art searches 
that contribute greatly to the rising litigation costs.265  Adopting a functionalist 
perspective would essentially guarantee that these costly aspects of litigation 
would occur, unless a case settled early.  The functionalist principle also relies 
heavily on §§ 102 and 103, statutory inquiries that investigate prior art.266  The 
jurisdictionalist viewpoint, on the other hand, considers § 101 to be a question 
of law that can be decided, in theory, with little to no discovery, and that prior 
art is irrelevant to a § 101 analysis.267 
Calls for patent reform focus largely on reducing the high costs of patent 
litigation, which many believe drive most of the abuses in the patent system.268  
Although the early disposition of a case on § 101 grounds may be cause for some 
alarm, especially before claim construction, it is far more problematic to close 
entirely the opportunity for courts to quickly resolve obvious invalidity cases—
                                                        
 262. Swetnam-Burland & Stitham, supra note 11, at 140. 
 263. Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patent-litigation/id=34808/. 
 264. See Bradley Kuxhausen, Comment, An E-Discovery Model Order: Saving the Golden 
Goose of Patent Litigation One Golden Egg at A Time, 4 CYBARIS AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 250, 
253 (2013) (noting that “[a]ttempt[s] to curb e-discovery costs ha[ve] been a priority of the 
American judicial system for some time now”); see also Neumeyer, supra note 263 (citing a 2011 
speech given by Judge Rader, who said, “I saw one analysis that concluded that .0074% of the 
documents produced actually made their way onto the trial exhibit list”). 
 265. See James M. Rice, The Defensive Patent Playbook, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725, 738 
(2015) (stating that “[i]n patent cases, a defendant typically searches extensively for prior art in 
order to make an invalidity argument, which results in significant discovery costs”); see also Joseph 
W. Dubis, Inter Partes Review: A Multi-Method Comparison for Challenging Patent Validity, 6 
CYBARIS AN INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107, 132 (2015). 
 266. See Cheryl Milone, A Powerful New Weapon Against Patent Trolls, FORBES (Nov. 15, 
2012, 5:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/11/15/a-powerful-new-
weapon-against-patent-trolls/ (stating prior art, since the implementation of the America Invents 
Act, has broadened in definition, and become the “killer app of the patent wars”). 
 267. In re Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 962–63 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (stating that unlike §§ 
102 and 103, prior art is entirely irrelevant to a §101 inquiry). 
 268. See James Bessen & Brian J. Love, Make the Patent “Polluters” Pay: Using Pigovian 
Fees to Curb Patent Abuse, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 84, 84–85 (2013). 
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saving millions in litigation expenses and “stem[ing] the tide of vexatious suits 
brought by the owners of vague and overbroad” patents.269 
2.  The Moral Compass 
The Supreme Court’s methodology of issuing ambiguous rulings and rejecting 
bright line frameworks is the only reasonable recourse for non-elected officials 
charged with the responsibility of determining, with little legislative guidance, 
matters with implications extending far from the purview of the judiciary.270 
Such ambiguity allows the Supreme Court to consider, as Professor Tun-Jen 
Chiang suggests, the morality of its decision and the economic analysis of 
patentability jurisprudence. 271  The judiciary, either consciously or 
subconsciously, already considers morality—most exemplified in the Myriad 
decision—which is not captured by bright line patentability tests, inconsistent 
with § 101 jurisprudence, and grounded in a suspect scientific foundation.272 
The ability of the courts to raise a § 101 question, challenging the eligibility 
of subject matter sought to be patented, provides an additional avenue for the 
judiciary to protect the public from mischievous conduct and technologies that 
truncate continuing technological research. 273  Although sometimes 
exasperating, operating under a flexible standard is a necessary evil, which 
positions § 101 as a threshold against morally bankrupt patents until a more 
                                                        
 269. David Bohrer, Guest Post: In Rush to Invalidate Patents at Pleadings Stage, Are Courts 
Coloring Outside the Lines?, PATENTLY-O (July 1, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/07/ 
invalidate-pleadings-coloring.html 
Addressing 35 U.S.C. § 101 at the outset not only conserves scarce judicial resources and 
spares litigants the staggering costs associated with discovery and protracted claim 
construction litigation, it also works to stem the tide of vexatious suits brought by the 
owners of vague and overbroad business method patents.  Accordingly . . . asserted 
claims [that] are plainly directed to a patent ineligible abstract idea, [the Federal Circuit 
has] repeatedly sanctioned a district court’s decision to dispose of them on the pleadings. 
Id. 
 270. See supra Part I. 
 271. See Chiang, supra note 12, at 1861 (“I am not arguing that PSM law ought to be moralistic 
or that patents ought to be granted or denied on moral grounds. I am simply saying that moral 
concerns are in fact built deeply into the fabric of existing PSM debates, and this fact should be 
recognized.”).  As Chiang states “[t]he surface consensus among scholars and judges that moral 
values play little or no role in [patentable subject matter] law paints an inaccurate portrait.” Id. at 
1860. This systematic blindness to actual understanding of patentable subject matter law, Chiang 
believes, is why progress in the field has been unsuccessful. See id. at 1860–61. 
 272. Id. at 1875. Myriad is first and foremost about a moral concern: “[o]ne cannot understand 
Myriad—why the case was brought, why it attracted media attention, and why it went all the way 
up to the Supreme Court” without understanding the moral concern.  Id.  The surge of media 
attention was simple: the first page of the writ of certiorari asks, “Are human genes patentable?”  
Id. at 1862.  This provocative question, coupled with the pre-litigation actions of Myriad, captured 
the nation’s attention, and forced the Supreme Court to rule on an incredibly technical issue.  Id. 
 273. See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on A Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in 
Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 525 (2004) 
(describing the extent of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction). 
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empirical analysis can be developed and implemented through the proper 
channels. 
The proper channels are the political branches of government, but should also 
include the Federal Circuit, a specialized court, for purposes of developing the 
nuances of § 101 jurisprudence where Congress cannot.274  Although the patent 
community’s frustration with the Supreme Court is reasonable,275 looking to the 
Supreme Court for guidance concerning § 101 is foolhardy.276  The Supreme 
Court, instead, is best positioned to determine decisions core to the very 
foundation of patent law—such as matters invoking morality concerns—while 
the Federal Circuit should be left to determine more substantive decisions 
concerning patent law.277  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit ought to drive the 
creation of a workable § 101 framework.  Not only would the expertise of the 
court balance against the complexities of technology driving most of the 
analytical confusion, but the sheer number of § 101 cases the Federal Circuit 
considers and the number of specialized judges and law clerks should also 
compel a more workable framework through trial and error.278 
Further, treating § 101 as a matter of jurisdiction helps grow the body of law 
as specialized judges, sua sponte—whether through an opinion narrowly 
fashioned to address the specific set of facts or an opinion attempting to establish 
a more general framework—can continue to inch § 101 doctrine forward 
towards a more workable framework, while serving the dual purpose of 
decreasing the cost of patent litigation.  Meaningful efforts to clarify § 101 likely 
require continual evaluation and engagement by the Federal Circuit—by 
soliciting amicus briefs and provoking engaging dialogue within the patent 
community.279 
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 275. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 8, at 35; see also Robert H. Sloss, Have We Seen This 
Movie Before? The Supreme Court Again Takes Up Patent-Eligibility in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
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 279. See David Kappos, Crafting A 21st Century United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
76 MO. L. REV. 639, 640 (2011) (welcoming and commending the leadership role the Federal 
Circuit played in the campaign in support of the American Invents Act). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
As Judge Mayer noted, at a more fundamental level, the plenary authority 
granted to Congress to issue patents is “not unbounded.”280   The authority, 
incentivizing advancement in the fields of Science and Arts by securing a limited 
exclusionary right, is both a “power and a limitation.”281  The power is limited 
by the Constitution, and only § 101, not §§ 102, 103 or 112, remains capable of 
“ensur[ing] that the nation’s patent laws remain tethered to their constitutional 
mooring.”282 
Calls to remove § 101 altogether overlook the important role the statute plays.  
It is an important safety net for the public—serving as a moral gatekeeper 
covering patents that pass muster under the other patentability requirements, but 
still represent a moral and utilitarian conundrum.  Therefore, the jurisdictional 
threshold qualities of § 101 represent an opportunity for courts to raise such  
§ 101 concerns sua sponte when public policy demands.  Public policy is served, 
in return, by proactively filtering such classes of morally bankrupt patents, by 
potentially decreasing the costs of patent litigation, and by allowing litigants to 
challenge the case on the pleadings, thereby avoiding unnecessary discovery, 
while at the same time, granting both the federal district courts and the Federal 
Circuit the capability to continue to move the § 101 ball forward. 
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